In Summary
This month, The Australian Microcap Fund, Smaller Companies Fund and Opportunities Fund increased in June (+0.3%, +0.2%, +0.6% respectively), which resulted in underperformance (-0.7%, -0.8%, -1.1% respectively) versus the Benchmark.
Looking at the Benchmark, we note the bottom five performers as measured by % price movement after reinvestment of dividends were: – Retail Food Group (RFG.ASX, -85%), Blue Sky Alternative Investments (BLA.ASX, -80%), CSG (CSV.ASX, -69%), Beadell Resources (BDR.ASX, -69%) and iSentia Group (ISD.ASX, -65%). The only one the Fund owned being ISD. The others generally having poor cash flow dynamics and, in some instances, parlous balance sheets. It’s difficult to envisage how these companies survive given that equation, albeit if history is any guide there could be a lot of money made in one, possibly two of these names. Specialty Fashion Group (SFH.ASX) resuscitation from a near death experience being a recent case in point. Whitehaven Coal (WHC.ASX) being another example from a couple of years ago.
iSentia Group (ISD.ASX)
In respect of ISD, we underestimated the level of price erosion in the media monitoring industry instigated by Meltwater – a private company founded in Norway. Its focus is online and social media, but it also monitors traditional media. It is an efficient technology led player that has taken an estimated 15% (measured by revenue) of the Australian media monitoring market. We believe most of its clients are small and tend to churn but it makes relatively good money. As we understand, it has approximately $20m of revenue and a margin of around 30%. ISD on the other hand is skewed to mid-large clients and has approximately $90m of revenue and a margin of 25%. We could be wrong, but we believe a new industry copyright agreement could be blessing in disguise for ISD, if as we understand there is a harmonisation of costs across participants. Currently ISD is paying about $16m per annum for its copyright licence, given it is around 4x the size of Meltwater you would reasonably guess that Meltwater should be paying around $4m in copyright fees. As we understand this is not the case and Meltwater is paying a fraction of that. Any significant increase in copyright licence fees for Meltwater will mean it needs to lift end prices substantially to maintain current profitability. However, there is some risk that the Copyright Agency Limited (CAL) increases licencing costs across all users. In the case of ISD there may be a lag before it can recover the cost increase. Recovery may also be difficult if Meltwater sidesteps a copyright increase or decides to maintain its price discount to win share at the expense of margin. As is often the case in the sharemarket money is made when uncertainty is at an extreme and you feel most uncomfortable.
Top Performers
The top five performers in the Benchmark as measured by % price movement after reinvestment of dividends were: – Beach Energy (BPT.ASX, +214%), A2 Milk Company (A2M.ASX, + 180%), Altium (ALU.ASX, +166%), Sino Gas & Energy Holdings (SEH.ASX, +162%) and MG Unit Trust (MGC.ASX, + 143%). We missed BPT, A2M and ALU due to valuation. Of these companies only two had a market cap less than $500m, being SEH and MGC. The other two companies did not have the cash flow dynamics as dictated by our process with MGC having a very weak balance sheet to boot. MGC was effectively taken over by Saputo during the year which saw the share price rally significantly from a very distressed level. SEH was also subject to takeover from Lone Star, a private equity firm.
Class (CL1.ASX)
Recently, we have had a lot of enquiry about our investment in Class (CL1.ASX). As is often the case when share prices are falling and you go against the grain, you tend to receive the most inbounds. Funnily enough Cabcharge (CAB.ASX) was in the same boat only a few months ago when it was plumbing lows around $1.60, with the CAB share price rally to $2.50 those concerns have been alleviated for now. We view CL1 as one of the few true growth propositions in the Australian market, whilst growth has slowed we note it is still adding over 20k accounts on an annualised basis (we include Class Portfolio as we believe these are nearly as valuable as SMSF accounts). Relative to a base of 160k this still equates to organic growth of +14%. This despite the main competitor (BGL) heavily promoting its cloud (BGL 360) offering by providing a 12-month fee holiday to its desktop users when they switch. A clever move really given two-thirds of CL1’s account wins in 2017 came from BGL desktop according to an independent survey conducted by Investment Trends. We assume this has led to a flood of previous desktop users moving to BGL 360 thus reducing CL1’s growth in recent quarters. This begs the question as to how long BGL can sustain the fee discounts/holiday. With no publicly available financial information we can only go off comments from BGL management that revenue is somewhere between $16m to $22m. Given CL1 has a cost base around $20m and a narrower business, we wonder how long the discounting by BGL can last. Regardless, CL1 is in a strong position to grow, just probably not at the past rates given it now has 27% of the SMSF market.
We believe there are two reasons to remain optimistic on the growth outlook:
1) In the long term we believe Class Portfolio could be disruptive in the non-super platform space as dealer groups increasingly access financial products directly and rebate any savings derived through group buying power to clients.
2) In the short-medium term we do not believe AMP is a natural owner of SuperMate, which is a competing Cloud SMSF software provider with 7% market share (>40k accounts) which is sub-scale. Given BGL has over 40% market share we believe it would struggle to achieve ACCC clearance to acquire SuperMate, which makes CL1 the obvious buyer. Assuming average revenue per account is $100 pa, SuperMate would be generating about $4m in revenue. This additional revenue would come at very little incremental cost to CL1 and hence would be accretive to valuation. For AMP it eliminates a non-core business that is likely loss-making. The only sticking point to the deal being who buys the front-end administration business, Super Concepts, from AMP. This would represent about one-quarter of the accounts on SuperMate based on our estimates.
Final Thoughts
At 30 June 2018, the Fund’s cash levels were higher than usual to fund a significant distribution to unit holders. The high cash levels do not reflect our view on opportunity set, in fact we have found several new companies to invest in recently that tick our investment process requirements.